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WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS:
ANOTHER LOOK AT
EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
LIBBY GREISMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v.
1
Washington, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was a muddled and
unsettled area of constitutional law that often merged with
evidentiary hearsay rules. In Crawford, however, the Court redefined
2
the purpose of the Confrontation Clause by emphasizing the right of
the defendant to test evidence against him in the “crucible of cross3
examination.” In a string of recent cases, the Court has continued on
this trajectory, delineating the scope of its newly developed
4
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. In Williams v. Illinois, the Court
will have the opportunity to do so again, this time by focusing on the
admissibility of forensic evidence through expert testimony. Williams
offers the Court yet another opportunity to apply the recently
developed doctrine, to strengthen the essential right afforded by the
Sixth Amendment, and to ensure the continued viability of the
Crawford test.
II. FACTS
On the evening of February 10, 2000, 22-year-old L.J. was walking
home from her job at a Chicago clothing store when a man came up
behind her and forced her to sit in the backseat of a beige station

* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Id.
3. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
4. Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. argued Dec. 6, 2011).
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wagon. The man told her to take off her clothes and then vaginally
6
penetrated L.J. while choking her. After the assault, the man pushed
L.J. out of the car and drove away with her coat, money, and other
7
8
items. L.J. then ran home, where her mother called the police.
When the police officers arrived, L.J. told them what had
9
transpired and was then transported to the emergency room. There,
Dr. Nancy Schubert performed a vaginal exam and took vaginal
swabs, which she placed into a sexual assault evidence collection kit
10
along with a sample of L.J.’s blood. On February 15, the Illinois State
Police (ISP) Crime Lab received the kit and performed tests that
11
confirmed the presence of semen.
Six months later, police arrested the defendant for an unrelated
12
offense and, pursuant to a court order, collected a blood sample.
Forensic scientist Karen Kooi performed an analysis on the sample,
extracted a DNA profile for the defendant, and entered it into the
13
database at the ISP Crime Lab. Meanwhile, the samples from L.J.’s
sexual assault kit had been sent to Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory
14
for DNA analysis. Cellmark derived a DNA profile for L.J.’s alleged
15
rapist. Finally, ISP forensic biologist Sandra Lambatos received the
DNA profile from Cellmark, compared it to the DNA profile she
received from Karen Kooi, and concluded that the two profiles were a
16
match. When L.J. identified the defendant in a line-up nearly eight
17
18
months later, the defendant was arrested for the alleged offenses.
At trial, Lambatos testified that it was “a commonly accepted
practice in the scientific community for one DNA expert to rely on
the records of another DNA analyst to complete her work,” and that
she relied on Cellmark’s testing and analysis to inform her opinion in
19
this case. Over defense counsel’s objections, Lambatos then testified
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ill. 2010).
Brief for Respondent at 1, Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2011).
Id.
Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 270.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270–71.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that, in her expert opinion, the DNA from the semen recovered on
20
L.J.’s vaginal swab matched the defendant’s DNA. Although
Cellmark’s report informed Lambatos’s testimony and conclusion, the
21
report itself was not introduced into evidence. The trial court denied
the defendant’s motion to strike the evidence of Cellmark’s testing on
22
Sixth Amendment grounds. Thereafter, the trial court found the
defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and one
23
count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery.
On appeal, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
results of Cellmark’s testing and analysis were testimonial in nature
and Lambatos’s expert testimony—relying on those results—violated
24
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The
appellate court held that “Cellmark’s report was not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was offered to provide a basis
25
for Lambatos’[s] opinion.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that
26
decision, stating that because the Confrontation Clause does not bar
the admission of testimonial statements admitted for purposes other
27
than proving the truth of the matter asserted, the defendant’s Sixth
28
Amendment right was not violated.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
29
with the witnesses against him.” The relationship between exceptions
to the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause has often raised
30
difficult questions for courts. The Supreme Court has, in recent
terms, attempted to address these questions and to refine the scope of
the Confrontation Clause, beginning in 2004 with Crawford v.
31
Washington.
20. Id. at 272.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 273.
24. People v. Williams, 895 N.E.2d 961, 969–70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
25. Id.
26. Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 282.
27. Id. at 277.
28. Id. at 282.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. See, e.g., Ian Volek, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door and the
Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 963–64 (2011) (evaluating
Rule 703’s intersection with other rules of evidence and Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
31. E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813
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In Crawford, the Supreme Court sought to define the illusory
32
terms contained within the Sixth Amendment. Under Crawford, a
“witness against” a defendant is defined as one who “bear[s]
33
testimony.” “Testimony,” in turn, is defined as a “solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
34
fact.” Crawford held that the Sixth Amendment’s primary concern is
35
with “testimonial hearsay.” The Confrontation Clause, therefore, bars
only testimonial statements that are admitted for the purpose of
36
proving the truth of the matter asserted. By establishing this test,
37
Crawford overruled the 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts and its
progeny, which permitted testimonial hearsay statements if the
defendant was unavailable and the statements bore adequate “indicia
38
of reliability.” Crawford emphasized that the reliability of evidence
was not an adequate substitute for “testing in the crucible of cross39
examination.” Thus, the new test transformed the Confrontation
40
Clause from a substantive reliability rule to a procedural guarantee.
The Crawford decision, though offering a laundry list of examples,
left open the debate on exactly what type of statements qualified as
41
“testimonial.” This question was later explored by the Court in Davis
42
v. Washington, which concerned the admissibility of statements made
43
to the police during or immediately after an emergency. In Davis, the
Court established a primary purpose test, defining statements made
during an interrogation as testimonial when “the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
44
relevant to later criminal prosecution.” The Court’s recent decision

(2006); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
32. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
33. Id. (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)).
34. Id. (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 33).
35. Id. at 53.
36. Id. at 59 n.9.
37. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
38. Id. at 66.
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
40. See id. at 67 (“To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands,
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in
the crucible of cross-examination.”).
41. Id. at 51–52.
42. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
43. Id. at 817.
44. Id. at 822.
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45

in Michigan v. Bryant further clarified that the primary purpose test
is an objective analysis of a reasonable participant and does not seek
to determine the “subjective or actual purpose of the individuals
46
involved in a particular encounter.”
The testimonial applications of the Confrontation Clause were
47
again at issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, which addressed
the admissibility of laboratory certificates of analysis when the testing
48
analyst does not appear at trial. The Court in Melendez-Diaz found
the sworn reports of state forensic analysts certifying that a tested
substance was cocaine to be testimonial, and thus their admission
without the testimony of the analysts violated the Confrontation
49
Clause. The Court stated that because they were “quite plainly
affidavits,” the certificates fell within the “core class of testimonial
50
statements” described in Crawford.
The affidavits were
“incontrovertibly a ‘solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
51
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’” Accordingly, the
certificates were meant to serve as a substitute for live witness
52
testimony, had no other purpose than for use at trial, and were
53
therefore unquestionably testimonial in nature.
54
In Bullcoming v. New Mexico —decided only a few days before
the Court granted certiorari in the instant case—the “[p]rincipal
evidence against [the defendant] was a forensic laboratory report
certifying that [his] blood-alcohol concentration was well above the
55
threshold for aggravated DWI.” At trial, the prosecution failed to
call to the stand the analyst who performed the test and signed the
56
report. Rather, the state called a different analyst who was
knowledgeable about the testing device and laboratory procedures
used but “had neither participated in nor observed the test on
45. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (holding that a statement given to police by a wounded crime
victim is nontestimonial because the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police
to deal with an ongoing emergency).
46. Id. at 1156.
47. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
48. Id. at 2531.
49. Id. at 2532.
50. Id. at 2531–32 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
55. Id. at 2709.
56. Id.
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Bullcoming’s blood sample.” In Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the
Court, she rejected New Mexico’s claim that the expert was simply
reporting “a machine-generated number,” explaining that his
representations as to procedure and protocol “relat[ed] to past events
and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data” and
58
were “meet for cross-examination.”
The Court then held that having a “surrogate” expert testify for
the analyst did not satisfy the Confrontation Clause because the
surrogate could not convey information about the specific test and
testing procedure utilized, nor did he offer any “independent opinion”
59
concerning the data. Further, surrogate testimony could not “expose
60
any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part.” Last, the Court
held that “the formalities attending [the certificate were] more than
61
adequate to qualify [the analyst’s] assertions as testimonial.” Thus,
when New Mexico elected to introduce the test into evidence, the
analyst who performed the test became a witness whom Bullcoming
62
had a Sixth Amendment right to confront.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring in part, emphasized the limited
reach of the Court’s opinion by eliciting four scenarios the decision
63
did not address. The third of these scenarios—”a case in which an
expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about
underlying testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into
64
evidence” —is similar to the facts now before the Court in Williams v.
Illinois.
In Williams, the Court will have an opportunity to resolve a split
on this question and to decide whether out-of-court statements
presented to explain the basis of an expert witness’s opinion
constitute hearsay. In addition to the Supreme Court of Illinois,
another state supreme court, a state appellate court, and the Tenth
Circuit have held that out-of-court statements relied upon by expert
witnesses do not implicate a defendant’s confrontation rights because
the statements are introduced not for their truth but to explain the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 2714.
Id. at 2715–16.
Id. at 2715.
Id. at 2717.
Id. at 2716.
Id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2722.
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65

basis of the expert’s opinion. Conversely, the Second Circuit and two
other state supreme courts have ruled in the opposite direction and
held that the Confrontation Clause does not permit out-of-court
66
testimonial statements to be presented through expert testimony. In
reaching its decision, the Court will be forced to fill another gap in the
Confrontation Clause analysis and to face the question of where to
draw the line in applying Crawford and its progeny.
IV. HOLDING
67

In People v. Williams, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
because the State did not offer Sandra Lambatos’s testimony
regarding the Cellmark report for the truth of the matter asserted,
68
Williams’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated. The court
emphasized that, after Crawford, the Confrontation Clause does not
bar the admission of testimonial statements admitted for purposes
69
other than proving the truth of the matter.
The court first examined whether the report at issue constituted
70
hearsay. Under the defendant’s theory, the Cellmark report
constituted hearsay because the State introduced it to establish the
71
truth of the matter asserted. According to the defendant, without
accepting the truth of Cellmark’s report, Lambatos could not have
testified that the defendant’s DNA matched the profile provided by
72
Cellmark. The State countered that Lambatos testified about the
65. See United States v. Pablo, 625 F.3d 1285, 1294 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that experts
may testify to the data and information produced by non-testifying analysts but not to the
analysts’ ultimate conclusions); State v. Tucker, 160 P.3d 177, 194 (Ariz. 2007), cert. denied, 552
U.S. 923 (2007) (holding that an expert does not admit hearsay or violate the Confrontation
Clause when the facts underlying his opinion are admissible only to show the basis of that
opinion and not to prove their truth); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 955–56 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that conclusions independently derived from the forensic work of others do not
implicate Melendez-Diaz, and therefore no Confrontation Clause right was violated).
66. See United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a gang expert
could not transmit testimonial statements directly to the jury); Commonwealth v. Avila, 912
N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (holding that a medical examiner could not testify to the
underlying factual findings of a non-testifying examiner who performed the autopsy); New York
v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–33 (N.Y. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1159 (2006) (holding
that out-of-court statements regarding the defendant’s behavior relied upon by the
prosecution’s expert were inadmissible under Crawford because the trier of fact had to accept
the statements as true in order to evaluate the expert’s testimony).
67. 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010).
68. Id. at 282.
69. Id. at 277 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)).
70. Id. at 278–80.
71. Id. at 278.
72. Id.
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Cellmark tests only to explain how she formed her own opinion.
Therefore, “the only statement that the prosecution offered for the
74
truth of the matter asserted was Lambatos’s own opinion.”
The court agreed with the State, reiterating its previous holdings
that prohibitions against the admission of hearsay do not apply when
an expert testifies to underlying facts and data for the purpose of
75
explaining the basis of his opinion. Here, the court found that
Lambatos testified to her conclusion based upon her own subjective
judgment about the comparison of the Cellmark report with the
76
defendant’s DNA profile. Thus, she used the Cellmark report to
form the basis of her opinion, in conformity with previous decisions
77
and to no abuse of the Confrontation Clause.
Second, the court distinguished the Cellmark reports from the
signed certificates in Melendez-Diaz, emphasizing that the reports
here were “part of the process used by Lambatos in rendering her
78
opinion” rather than a “bare-bones statement.” The court therefore
concluded that the cross-examination of Lambatos satisfied the Sixth
Amendment guarantee and upheld the appellate court’s decision that
79
there was no Confrontation Clause violation.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Williams’s Arguments
Petitioner Sandy Williams argues that the Confrontation Clause
does not permit the introduction of testimonial statements by a
forensic analyst through the testimony of a surrogate witness and that
the State violated the Confrontation Clause by presenting Cellmark’s
forensic DNA report through the live testimony of Sandra
80
Lambatos. In his argument, Williams relies upon the decisions in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, emphasizing that, as in those cases,
the forensic statements were presented for their truth and fell within
81
the scope of the Confrontation Clause’s protections.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 281–82.
Id. at 282.
Brief for Petitioner at 9, Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2011).
Id. at 10.
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1. Testimonial Statements
Williams argues that Cellmark’s forensic report is directly
analogous to the testimonial forensic reports in Melendez-Diaz and
82
Bullcoming. First, Williams stresses that, as in Melendez-Diaz and in
Bullcoming, the analysis was done at the request of the police in order
83
to assist in investigation and prosecution. The resulting report
qualifies as testimonial, Williams claims, because it was generated for
84
an evidentiary purpose—to assist in the prosecution of the case.
In contrast to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, however, the
85
forensic report here was not itself introduced into evidence. Williams
claims that formal admission of a testimonial statement is not
necessary for the Confrontation Clause to be implicated, as a
declarant’s out-of-court statement is “presented” at trial when its
substance is conveyed through the in-court testimony of another
86
witness.
Because the Confrontation Clause guarantees an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant regarding any testimonial
statement used by the prosecution, it does not matter whether that
testimonial statement is presented verbatim or is merely summarized
87
by the in-court witness. Williams argues that his confrontation right
was implicated when “Lambatos conveyed to the trier of fact the
substance of statements that had been conveyed to her by
88
Cellmark.” In doing so, Lambatos’s in-court testimony impermissibly
served as a substitute for “what Cellmark’s analysts would have
89
testified to had they testified at trial.”
2. Statements Presented for Their Truth
After concluding that Cellmark’s statements constituted
testimony, Williams next contends the Illinois Supreme Court erred in
finding that the statements were presented not for their truth but to
90
explain Lambatos’s opinion. According to Williams, “[t]he trier of
fact therefore necessarily had to assess Cellmark’s statements for
their truth” because they supported Lambatos’s opinion only to the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
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91

extent that they were true. If the profile reported by Cellmark was
not “accurately derived from the semen recovered from the [victim],
Lambatos’s opinion that the two profiles matched had no evidentiary
92
value.” Because Lambatos’s testimony regarding Cellmark’s report
was presented to establish the truth of that report, it fell within the
93
scope of the Confrontation Clause’s protections.
As the Cellmark report was both testimonial and presented for
the truth of the matter, Williams concludes that affording him the
right to confront the analysts who performed the tests is the only way
94
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Williams argues that Bullcoming
“conclusively decided that the Confrontation Clause does not allow
the testimonial statements of a forensic analyst to be introduced
95
through the trial testimony of a surrogate analyst.” Cross-examining
Lambatos during Williams’s trial did not satisfy the Confrontation
Clause because Lambatos could not describe what particular tests and
protocols Cellmark’s analysts followed during the “complicated multi96
step process.”
3. Federal Rule of Evidence 703
Last, Williams compares the Confrontation Clause right with
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which “allows an expert witness to rely
on and disclose otherwise inadmissible evidence so long as the
evidence is ‘of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
97
particular field.’” Williams argues that although the Confrontation
Clause does not ensure the reliability of the evidence itself, it does
ensure that the reliability of the evidence is tested under crossexamination. Accordingly, the constitutional guarantee can only be
98
satisfied through confrontation. Williams points out, however, that
because the Confrontation Clause deals only with testimonial
statements offered for their truth, FRE 703 is not rendered
inapplicable—it still applies when the statements are not testimonial
99
or are not offered for their truth.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
703)).
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 24 (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011)).
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 28 (quoting Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326–27 (Ill. 1981) (adopting FRE
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
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B. Illinois’s Arguments
Respondent Illinois argues that the Confrontation Clause does
not prohibit opinion testimony of a scientific expert based on outside
100
forensic reports that do not constitute hearsay. Alternatively, the
State argues that even if the Cellmark reports are found to be hearsay,
the judgment below should be affirmed because that hearsay was
101
nontestimonial. Finally, the State argues that even if there was a
Confrontation Clause violation, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
102
doubt.
1. Opinion Testimony of a Scientific Expert
The State argues that Cellmark’s report was permissibly
introduced to bolster Lambatos’s independent conclusions that
Petitioner’s DNA profile matched the DNA profile she received from
103
Cellmark. The State relies on Illinois Rule of Evidence 703, which
permits an expert witness to base an opinion or inference on facts or
data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
104
field. The State further relies on Melendez-Diaz, claiming that it
counsels against a requirement that any person involved in the testing
105
of the sample be subject to cross-examination.
Rather than
amounting to a Sixth Amendment violation, any weakness in the
witness’s testimony with regard to the data she relied upon should be
considered in the factfinder’s assessment of what weight to give the
106
expert’s opinion.
The State distinguishes the facts of Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming from the case at hand by again characterizing Lambatos
as more than a mere “conduit for the unconstitutional introduction of
107
testimonial hearsay.” In Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the incourt witnesses simply parroted the findings of the analysts without
100. Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 11.
101. Id. at 25.
102. Id. at 32.
103. Id. at 12–13.
104. Id. at 13–14. Illinois Rule of Evidence 703 is substantively the same as FRE 703.
105. Id. at 15 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 n.1 (2009) (“[I]t
is not the case . . . that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of
custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as
part of the prosecution’s case.”)).
106. Id. at 15 (“If the prosecution opts not to call a witness who can speak to chain of
custody, authenticity, or accuracy, this decision may weaken the State’s case, but it is not a Sixth
Amendment violation.”).
107. See id. at 17–20 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530–31; Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715–16 (2011)).
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108

offering any independent opinion. In contrast, Lambatos discussed
Cellmark’s work “only for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining the
109
basis of her expert opinion,” as permitted under Crawford. Because
the statements were not offered for their truth, the State argues that
cross-examining Lambatos was all that was required to satisfy the
110
defendant’s confrontation rights.
2. Nontestimonial Hearsay
The State argues alternatively that even if the Court concludes
that Lambatos’s testimony included hearsay, such hearsay was not
111
testimonial.
In Crawford, the Court established that the
Confrontation Clause is implicated only when out-of-court testimonial
112
statements are admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. The
State
argues
that
machine-generated
results, like
the
113
electropherogram at issue, are not testimonial statements. Because
testimony is defined as a “solemn declaration or affirmation,” and
solemnity is a human trait, the State concludes that testimony must
114
contain the statements of human witnesses. Though the production
of an electropherogram contains some level of human involvement,
“the machine output at the end of the testing process contains no
assertion by the employee and is, therefore, not that employee’s
115
statement for Confrontation Clause purposes.” At most, the
prosecution introduced raw data generated by a machine as the basis
116
for the testimony of an expert witness.
The State also argues that Cellmark’s report does not qualify as a
testimonial statement subject to the Confrontation Clause because it
does not pass the primary purpose test established in Michigan v.
117
Bryant. In contrast with the forensic reports in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, Cellmark’s report was produced not for “the primary
purpose of creating evidence for use at trial,” but for “facilitating

108.
16).
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 18 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530–31; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715–
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004)).
Id. at 26.
Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
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118

further forensic analysis.” The State distinguishes Cellmark’s report
from the reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming in two ways. First,
the Cellmark report did not contain any formality, such as a
certification or an oath, which would suggest that it was created with a
119
primary purpose of being introduced at trial. Second, the report was
comprised of documents that could be understood only by other
120
scientists and would be meaningless to the factfinder in this case. In
contrast, the reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming contained
citations to court rules or statutory provisions that allowed them to
121
serve as substantive evidence at trial. The State argues that because
the report could not serve as an alternative to trial testimony, it likely
was not made with that purpose in mind, and thus does not constitute
122
testimony subject to the Confrontation Clause.
3. Harmless Error
Finally, the State argues that even if the trial court erred in
admitting any part of Lambatos’s testimony, the error was harmless
123
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State contends that “Lambatos’s
testimony was independent of the victim’s credible and unequivocal
identification” of Williams, in a line-up and at trial, as the man who
124
attacked her. The trial judge specifically discussed the strength and
credibility of the victim’s identifications and announced that he was
not influenced by any “perceived infallibility of DNA analysis or
125
evidence.” Thus, even if the Court concludes that the trial court
erred in admitting Lambatos’s testimony, the error was harmless and
126
the judgment should stand.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
Williams v. Illinois presents an opportunity for the Court to decide
whether its newly constructed Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,
established in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, will be extended or
curtailed. Like the cases before it, Williams will turn on the specifics

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id.
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of the facts presented and the Court likely will not issue a broad
127
holding. First, the Court will have to decide whether the report at
hand constituted testimony for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the Court will focus on whether Lambatos truly came to an
“independent opinion” using Cellmark’s report. Finally, the Court
may also consider the repercussions of extending the Confrontation
Clause too far and may be wary of issuing an opinion that conflicts
with evidentiary rules and public policy considerations.
Both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming were decided by 5-4
majorities, with Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Roberts, and Alito
dissenting. These four Justices likely will maintain their stance that
“requiring the State to call the technician who filled out a form and
recorded the results of a test is a hollow formality” and no Sixth
128
Amendment violation occurs when that technician is not called.
Justices Ginsburg and Scalia are equally likely to continue to extend
the Confrontation doctrine crafted in the opinions they issued in the
previous two cases. Thus, the outcome of Williams likely hinges on the
votes of Justice Sotomayor, who voiced concern over a similar
129
situation in her concurrence in Bullcoming, and Justice Thomas, who
placed an emphasis on the formalities attending the statements in
130
Melendez-Diaz.
A. The Court Likely Will Find the Cellmark Report to be Testimonial
Although the State urges that, without a certification or oath,
Cellmark’s report was “informal” and served no direct evidentiary
131
purpose, the Court is unlikely to find this argument persuasive. The
Court specifically declared in Bryant that “[f]ormality is not the sole
132
touchstone of our primary purpose inquiry.” Thus, even though the
report did not have an official certificate or oath, the Court likely will
look beyond formalities to the primary purpose of the report’s
creation.
Here, arguing that the report was made for any reason other than
for aiding the investigation and prosecution of a crime would be an
uphill battle. The DNA profile was made at the behest of the police in
127. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the limited reach of the Court’s holding).
128. Id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
130. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
131. Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 30.
132. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011).

GREISMANN FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/12/2012 8:58 PM

WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS: ANOTHER LOOK AT EXPERT TESTIMONY

147

connection with a specific crime and was not part of any routine
133
gathering of medical information. As in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, the analysts tested the evidence and submitted a report
134
of their results to the police. It is no great logical leap to conclude
that the police requested the analysis in order to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of the victim’s attacker. Moreover,
Lambatos explicitly testified at trial that “all reports in this case were
prepared for this criminal investigation [and] the eventual litigation
135
here.” Because the report was made for an evidentiary purpose to
assist in the prosecution of the case, it should satisfy Bryant’s primary
136
purpose test and rank as testimonial.
Justice Thomas may argue that, without formalities, this report
does not “fall within the core class of testimonial statements governed
137
by the Confrontation Clause.” In contrast, Richard Friedman,
amicus for Petitioner Williams, argues that the very fact that the
statement was made to assist in the prosecution implicates the
purpose of the Confrontation Clause, and “a court should guard
against allowing the statement to be used to prove a matter that it
asserted without the witness who made the statement . . . being
138
subjected to confrontation.”
Recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Derr v.
139
State, a case similar to Williams. Although not binding on the
Supreme Court, the Maryland court’s approach is helpful in analyzing
the same theories that may be applied in Williams. The court in Derr
found that the DNA profile report introduced at trial constituted
testimony because “the DNA profile and report are made for the
primary purpose of establishing facts relevant to a later prosecution,
and an objective analyst would understand that the statements will be
140
used in a later trial.” The court also rejected the theory that machine
133. See Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 15,
Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2011) (suggesting a physician requesting routine
blood tests to help him form an opinion in anticipation of testimony would not raise a
Confrontation Clause problem).
134. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
135. Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note
133, at 14 n.8.
136. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 14.
137. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
138. Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note
133, at 16.
139. 29 A.3d 533 (Md. 2011).
140. Id. at 549.
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products are not testimonial and relied on Bullcoming to hold that
the testimonial statement includes not only the scientific results, but
141
also the underlying process or procedure. Thus, the only way to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause is to afford the defendant the right
to cross-examine the analyst who in fact performed the testing,
142
allowing any “lapses or lies” to be exposed.
B. The Court Likely Will Find Lambatos’s Opinion to be Dependent
upon the Report
The question of whether Lambatos offered her own truly
“independent opinion,” as characterized by Justice Sotomayor in
Bullcoming, is intrinsically tied to the question of whether the report
was presented for its truth or merely presented to bolster Lambatos’s
143
opinion. This opinion was uncontestably based, at least in part, on
the Cellmark report. Lambatos used the DNA profile Cellmark
produced to reach the further conclusion that Williams’s DNA
144
matched that found on the vaginal swabs. Without Cellmark’s
145
report, this conclusion could not have been drawn. Thus, Lambatos’s
opinion was “independent” in the sense that she came to a new
conclusion: the two profiles matched. Nonetheless, this conclusion was
completely dependent on the report provided to her. A more fitting
characterization, then, is that put forth by amicus: that Lambatos
146
provided “added value” to the Cellmark report.
Rather than simply transmitting its contents to the factfinder,
Lambatos provided added value to the report by using it to conclude
147
that the DNA profiles matched. This use does not match up exactly
to the scenario contemplated by Justice Sotomayor, which posits an
expert presenting an independent opinion about the very data at
148
issue. Instead, Lambatos relied on the opinion of the analyst who

141. Id. at 553–54 (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011)).
142. Id. at 554 (quoting Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715).
143. See Richard Friedman, Initial Thoughts on Williams, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG
(July 9, 2011, 2:26 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/07/initial-thoughts-onwilliams.html.
144. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 20.
145. Id.
146. Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note
133, at 18.
147. Id.
148. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (explaining that “the State
does not assert that [the expert] offered an independent, expert opinion about Bullcoming’s
blood alcohol concentration,” where the blood alcohol test was the testimony at issue).
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had actually performed the initial test and provided no additional
149
insight about the DNA profile analysis performed.
Because Lambatos used Cellmark’s report to draw her conclusion,
presuming that the report was not presented for its truth would
150
constitute a logical fallacy. Other courts and scholars recognize the
incoherency of this argument as well, stating, for example, “[t]he
distinction between a statement offered for its truth and a statement
offered to shed light on an expert’s opinion is not meaningful in this
151
context.” The present case provides a perfect illustration of this
principle. Proof that Williams’s DNA matched the DNA found on the
vaginal swabs required three elements: proof that the DNA profile on
the vaginal swabs was accurate, proof that Petitioner’s DNA profile
152
was accurate, and proof that the matching analysis was accurate. If
“the trier of fact did not accept as true” any one of these elements,
153
Lambatos’s opinion had no evidentiary value. Thus, the trier of fact
necessarily had to consider the truth of Lambatos’s testimony
regarding the Cellmark report in order to evaluate her opinion, and
the testimony fell within the scope of the Confrontation Clause’s
154
protections.
C. Avoiding Possible Conflicts with the Federal Rules of Evidence
The Court should be able to find that Williams had a right to
confront the analyst who performed the test without creating a
conflict between the Confrontation Clause and Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 for three reasons.
First, evidentiary doctrine and the Confrontation Clause involve
two separate bodies of law: the evidentiary rule is concerned chiefly
with reliability, whereas the Confrontation Clause has been expressly
interpreted as rejecting the reliability test in favor of requiring testing

149. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 26 (“That Lambatos reviewed one of
Cellmark’s electropherograms does not make her opinion somehow independent of Cellmark’s
work. . . . Lambatos’s opinion was completely dependent on Cellmark’s analysts having
performed the analysis correctly.”).
150. See id. at 20 (“[T]he ‘not-for-its-truth’ rationale is logically incoherent where such
statements support the expert’s opinion only to the extent that they are true . . . .”).
151. People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–33 (N.Y. 2005); see also People v. Dungo, 98
Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 816 (2007).
152. Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note
133, at 18.
153. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 22.
154. Id.

GREISMANN FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

150

2/12/2012 8:58 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 7

155

by cross-examination. The rule does not purport to abrogate a
constitutional provision through hearsay exceptions. Second, the
evidentiary rule would still operate to allow an expert to testify to an
inference drawn from one or more testimonial statements when those
156
statements are not disclosed or discussed during trial.
The
Confrontation Clause is only at issue when, as here, the expert clearly
bases his or her opinion on a report generated by a named outside
source. Third, the Confrontation Clause is implicated only when a
prosecution expert offers an opinion based on a testimonial statement
157
made by an outside source. Reports prepared by technicians
without any contemplation of assisting in a prosecution would be
unaffected, as these statements do not qualify as testimony under the
158
Bryant test. Thus, even if the Court finds a Sixth Amendment
violation in this case, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 need not be found
unconstitutional or rendered inapplicable.
In conclusion, the Court is likely to extend its holdings in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming and find a Sixth Amendment
violation here. Though the facts of this case differ only subtly from
those of the previous cases, the difference is one that the Court has
implicitly acknowledged as worth addressing. The Court should seize
the opportunity to seal yet another gap in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence and continue in its “rather straightforward
159
application” of Crawford doctrine.

155. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 n.1 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“The rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause, are designed primarily to
police reliability; the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to determine whether statements
are testimonial and therefore require confrontation.”).
156. See Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 133, at 11–12, n.5.
157. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 30.
158. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
159. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009).

